Are strategic balances in the Middle East being reshaped solely through formal alliances? Or have sovereign investments, personal relationships, and networks of influence become part of the calculus of power?
The account presented in investigative journalist Matthew Cole’s book, Princes and Thieves: Jared Kushner and Mohamed bin Zayed’s Secret Plot to Remake the Middle East, raises these questions through its examination of alleged financial and political ties connecting Jared Kushner with Gulf leaders. A geopolitical assessment of the book, however, requires a clear distinction between the claims advanced by the investigation, the facts established by independent sources, and the conclusions that can reasonably be drawn about strategic change in the region.
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An editorial illustration exploring the relationship between Jared Kushner, Gulf investment, and the changing strategic landscape of the Middle East. |
Princes and Thieves: Kushner and Gulf Money
Journalist Matthew Cole’s Princes and Thieves was published on October 25, 2026, according to Simon & Schuster. The book presents the author’s account of a network of interests allegedly linking Kushner with Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Mohammed bin Salman. As described in the book’s published materials, these relationships bring together personal connections, financial interests, diplomacy, and regional issues involving Israel, Iran, and Palestine.
In an excerpt published by Vanity Fair, Cole discussed allegations involving Kushner’s phone, bank accounts, and financial transfers said to connect him with entities in the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. These allegations, however, should not be presented as conclusively established facts. In a response published on October 22, 2026, Kushner and his legal representatives denied allegations concerning the purported accounts and challenged several aspects of the investigation’s account.
Although we have not yet had the opportunity to read the book in full, its title and the debate surrounding it on social media make the relationship between capital and political power an important subject for analysis. Examining this relationship may help us understand how current developments could contribute to shifts in the global balance of power and, consequently, in regional strategic alignments.
From an academic standpoint, the appropriate response is neither to treat the book’s central claims as established facts nor to dismiss them outright simply because the parties concerned dispute them. The task is to examine the evidence supporting each account. Evidence of the existence of a bank account does not, by itself, establish the identity of its ultimate beneficiary. Evidence of a financial transfer does not prove that the payment was made in exchange for a political decision. Likewise, the fact that a decision coincides with a particular actor’s interests does not establish that this actor caused the decision to be made.
The central question, therefore, should not be reduced to whether a “secret plot” exists to remake the Middle East. Instead, the analysis must investigate the nature of the alleged network, its potential capacity to influence specific decisions, and the evidence linking financial relationships to political outcomes.
Gulf Money and Kushner’s Investment Firm: Allegations and Established Facts
Documented investment relationships do exist between Affinity Partners, the investment firm Kushner established after leaving the White House in 2021, and investors from the Gulf.
On March 28, 2025, *Reuters reported that the assets managed by Affinity Partners had risen to approximately $4.8 billion at the end of 2024, following additional capital inflows from investors that included Abu Dhabi-based Lunate and the Qatar Investment Authority.
The report also stated, citing information from US congressional investigators, that Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund had invested $2 billion in the firm.
These facts raise legitimate questions about potential conflicts of interest, the transition from public service to private investment, financial transparency, and the adequacy of disclosure and oversight mechanisms. They do not, however, establish that a particular investment was payment for an official decision made by Kushner while serving in government. Establishing such a connection would require evidence linking the financial transaction to the decision—for example, correspondence, independent testimony, or documents demonstrating a specific request and a corresponding political response.
This is where it becomes essential to distinguish between three levels of influence: access to a decision-maker, influence over a decision, and control over a decision. A personal or financial relationship may provide access to a powerful official, but access does not necessarily imply influence. Even where influence can be demonstrated, it does not follow that the individual or entity concerned has the power to control every outcome.
From the perspective of political economy, the significance of this case lies in the possibility of examining how private capital intersects with public office, rather than assuming that every foreign investment is an instrument for purchasing political decisions.
The question becomes more precise when we investigate the mechanisms through which money may be converted into political influence. Who has the authority to make the investment decision? What is the nature of the relationship between the investor and the political official? Are there explicit or implicit obligations? And can these relationships be linked to a specific official policy decision?
The Abraham Accords: An Open Transformation of Regional Alliances
The Abraham Accords constitute one of the most important developments against which the book’s arguments should be examined.
In September 2020, agreements to normalize relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain were signed with direct US involvement. The official Abraham Accords Declaration, dated September 15, 2020, documents the publicly stated objectives concerning diplomatic relations, cooperation, and trade.
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The signing ceremony of the Abraham Accords at the White House, September 15, 2020. |
From a geopolitical perspective, normalization cannot be understood merely as the opening of embassies or an expansion of diplomatic exchanges. It also creates channels for economic, technological, security, and cultural cooperation, thereby reorganizing aspects of the participating states’ relationships with Israel. A study published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in April 2025 examined the effect of the Gaza war on the political context surrounding the accords and the extent to which their future remained dependent on broader regional and international developments.
The accords themselves are public and documented. Their existence does not, by itself, constitute evidence of secret financing or an undisclosed bargain. Establishing a connection between private funds and the terms of normalization, or between such funds and specific US decisions related to the accords, would require evidence linking identifiable actors to a traceable decision-making process.
The Palestinian issue also reveals the limits of attempts to construct regional arrangements around security and economic interests alone.
In an official statement dated February 5, 2025, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reaffirmed that the Kingdom would not establish diplomatic relations with Israel without the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. The official Saudi foreign ministry statement demonstrates why the trajectory of normalization cannot be reduced to a strategic convergence over Iran or to shared commercial interests.
Any analysis of the emerging strategic landscape must therefore examine the tensions between security cooperation, economic interests, political legitimacy, and the place of the Palestinian question in regional calculations.
Political regimes may find their interests aligned on a particular issue without agreeing on every aspect of the regional order they seek to establish.
Iran and Regional War: Intentions Do Not Guarantee Outcomes
The confrontation with Iran provides an important test of any interpretation seeking to explain the reshaping of Middle Eastern strategy.
According to an update published by the US-based Council on Foreign Relations on October 23, 2026, the United States and Israel launched strikes against Iran on February 28, 2026. Subsequent efforts to contain the escalation involved Pakistani mediation and an understanding reached in June, before renewed strikes and continuing disagreements over Iran’s nuclear program, the Strait of Hormuz, and sanctions. The Council on Foreign Relations continues to track the confrontation.
This context does not establish that the alleged network involving Kushner caused the war. A military decision of this magnitude cannot responsibly be attributed to a financial relationship without direct documentary evidence.
Nevertheless, the confrontation illustrates an important point: the reshaping of a regional order depends not only on the intentions of decision-makers. War may produce outcomes that contradict publicly stated objectives, raise the costs of maintaining security, undermine confidence in external security guarantees, or encourage regional states to diversify their international partnerships.
From the perspective of political history, three dimensions must be distinguished: the declared objective, the mechanism through which a decision is made, and the outcome that actually follows.
A power may seek to contain a regional adversary, yet the resulting confrontation may generate wider escalation, prompt other actors to reposition themselves, or disrupt maritime routes. Such outcomes cannot be treated as evidence that a particular political strategy succeeded unless the strategy’s objectives are clearly identified and a demonstrable causal connection between those objectives and the resulting developments is established.
This is one of the fundamental differences between evidence-based geopolitical analysis and a narrative that explains every development as the outcome of a single, centrally coordinated plan. History frequently produces unintended consequences through the interaction of multiple decisions, even when the objectives of some of the actors involved partially overlap.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates: Strategic Partnership or Competition for Regional Leadership?
Competition between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi places an important limit on the idea of a unified Gulf bloc.
A House of Commons Library report published on May 28, 2026 highlighted areas of divergence between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, including Yemen, Sudan, Israel, and oil policy, despite their continuing shared interests in trade, security, and relations with the United States.
Convergence in confronting Iran or cooperating with Washington does not necessarily mean that Saudi and Emirati priorities are identical. Each state has its own conception of regional influence, ports, trade routes, local partners, and its position within the global economy.
The two countries may cooperate on one issue while competing on another. This makes the analysis of political networks considerably more complex than portraying them as a unified bloc directed by a single centre of power.
The consequences of this competition extend beyond bilateral relations. They may affect security partnerships, investment priorities, the distribution of influence in fragile states, and relations with international powers. They may also produce outcomes that neither side intended independently, particularly when economic competition intersects with military calculations and maritime routes.
This requires each relationship and decision to be examined individually rather than assuming that connected actors share identical objectives simply because they maintain close ties.
It also requires recognition that states are not fixed entities with permanently uniform priorities. Their interests may change over time, and a partnership that serves a particular purpose in one context may become a source of competition in another diplomatic arena.
Conclusion to Part One: From Political Finance to the Middle East’s Strategic Map
This brings us to the conclusion of the first part of this article.
An examination of Matthew Cole’s Princes and Thieves, together with the material published about it by various media outlets, suggests that understanding strategic change in the Middle East can no longer rely exclusively on formal alliances and military agreements. Sovereign investments, personal relationships, and networks of economic and political interests have become important subjects of investigation when assessing how influence is formed and distributed among regional and international powers.
Understanding these dynamics, however, requires a distinction between documented financial facts, allegations that remain disputed, and political outcomes for which a causal relationship must be demonstrated through evidence.
The central issue, therefore, is not whether a single network controls decision-making across the region. It is how different interests interact, under what circumstances economic and diplomatic relationships become instruments of influence, and how their consequences change when states’ calculations diverge or their priorities shift.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, despite overlapping interests on several issues, do not always pursue a common agenda. Nor can the policies of the United States, Israel, and the Gulf states be reduced to the will of one individual or a limited circle of private relationships.
Moreover, the Middle East’s strategic map is not shaped exclusively in Washington or the Gulf capitals. The effects of political and economic change become tangible at ports, along maritime routes, and around strategic chokepoints. This shifts the question from identifying who possesses influence to examining the geography in which that influence can be converted into the capacity to affect trade, energy flows, and regional security.
If investments, alliances, and personal networks redistribute influence among regional powers, the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb become critical arenas in which to assess the actual consequences of these transformations.
This question has particular significance for Egypt, because the security of the Suez Canal cannot be separated from developments in the southern Red Sea, competition over ports, or the trajectory of conflicts in Yemen, Sudan, and the Horn of Africa.
The question leading into the second part of this article is therefore the following: Are simultaneous developments in the Gulf, Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Red Sea cumulatively narrowing Egypt’s strategic room for manoeuvre, or are we witnessing a set of interconnected risks that cannot be explained as a unified project targeting Cairo?
Answering this question requires moving beyond political finance and networks of influence to examine strategic geography itself. Who possesses the capacity to influence ports and maritime routes? How does Saudi-Emirati competition intersect with developments in Yemen, Sudan, and the Horn of Africa? And what are the limits of these developments’ potential impact on the security of Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal, as well as Egypt’s wider regional interests?
In the next part of this article, “Where Does Egypt Stand in the New Strategic Map?”, we will move from analysing networks of interests and political relationships to examining maritime routes and centres of influence on the ground.
The objective is not to presume the existence of a unified strategic siege around Egypt. Rather, it is to investigate whether the simultaneous actions of regional and international powers are cumulatively producing a more complex and challenging strategic environment for Egyptian decision-makers.
The question is no longer simply who holds influence in the Middle East. It is where that influence is exercised, how it is converted into strategic leverage, and whether Egypt possesses the tools necessary to preserve its freedom of action in a region whose balance of power is changing at an accelerating pace.