Bab el-Mandeb After the Houthi Territorial Breakthrough: Reconfiguring the Red Sea Security Order
The Strait Is Still Open. The Strategic Environment Is Not.
For much of the Red Sea crisis, the central question was whether Houthi forces could threaten commercial shipping through Bab el-Mandeb. By September 2026, that question has become considerably broader.
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| Map of the maritime corridor linking the Gulf of Aden, Bab el-Mandeb, Red Sea, Suez Canal and Mediterranean |
The Houthis' rapid offensive along Yemen's western coast has brought them into direct proximity with the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and enabled them to seize the strategic port city of Mocha as well as islands in the southern Red Sea. The territorial breakthrough has coincided with renewed attacks on Saudi cities and energy infrastructure, a sharp deterioration in Yemen's internal security environment, and the expansion of international efforts to protect shipping.
Yet one distinction is essential. Bab el-Mandeb has not become a physically closed waterway. On September 18, preliminary Kpler data cited by Reuters recorded 23 commodity-vessel transits through the strait, compared with a ten-day average of about 26. The decline was limited, but it occurred against a much more dangerous security environment.
This distinction matters because modern maritime disruption does not require a formal closure. A chokepoint can lose part of its strategic utility when insurers, shipowners and cargo owners begin treating passage as less predictable. The result can be higher insurance premiums, altered deployment patterns, longer voyages and changes in the geography of ports and transshipment.
Research on the Red Sea crisis has documented precisely this mechanism. Studies using vessel-tracking and maritime-network data show that the crisis pushed ships away from the Red Sea, altered port connectivity and encouraged rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope. The resulting effects were not confined to Yemen: European maritime networks were reconfigured as well.
The strategic significance of the September 2026 escalation therefore lies less in the simple question of whether ships can still pass through Bab el-Mandeb than in what kind of security environment now surrounds that passage.
From Yemen's Civil War to a Red Sea Security System
The territorial gains of the Houthis have changed the geography of the conflict.
The UN Special Envoy for Yemen reported on September 10 that Houthi forces had captured Mocha, approximately 75 kilometres from Bab el-Mandeb, giving them a direct presence on the approaches to one of the world's most important maritime chokepoints. Subsequent UN and international reporting described further fighting along the western coast and reported Houthi control over additional islands in the southern Red Sea.
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| The strategic geography of Bab el-Mandeb: Mayun Island lies at the entrance separating the Red Sea from the Gulf of Aden. |
The significance of these positions does not depend on legal sovereignty over the international strait. Their importance lies in their operational relationship with the approaches to the strait.
This is where the geography of the Red Sea becomes inseparable from the geography of Yemen. Bab el-Mandeb links the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea, which in turn provides the maritime connection to the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean. The waterway is therefore not simply a local passage at the southern edge of Yemen. It is the southern component of a transregional economic corridor linking Asia, the Middle East, North Africa and Europe.
A 2026 article in The Journal of North African Studies argues that Bab el-Mandeb should be understood within an interregional Red Sea space in which maritime mobility, infrastructure and chokepoints help shape regional political geography.
This perspective is particularly relevant now because the conflict is no longer confined to the relationship between the Houthis and the Yemeni government. Saudi Arabia is directly involved; the United States is coordinating with regional partners; European naval forces are increasing their alert posture; China is attempting to use diplomatic influence over Iran; and Egypt is increasingly drawn into the security discussion because of the relationship between Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal.
The Red Sea is consequently becoming less useful as a collection of separate national theatres and more useful as a single interconnected security environment.
September 2026: When the Maritime and Energy Crises Converged
The new phase of the crisis is particularly significant because Bab el-Mandeb is now interacting with a second disrupted chokepoint: the Strait of Hormuz.
The simultaneous instability of the two waterways has changed their strategic relationship.
For Saudi Arabia, Bab el-Mandeb has become more important precisely because Hormuz has been severely disrupted by the wider U.S.-Iran confrontation. The kingdom's alternative routes to global markets therefore matter more at exactly the moment when security around Yemen's western coast has deteriorated.
That vulnerability was demonstrated by the attack on Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline. Reuters reported on September 18 that damage to the pipeline had forced Saudi Aramco to suspend some October crude deliveries to at least two European refiners. The attack damaged three pumping stations and temporarily disrupted operations linked to Yanbu, while Aramco was seeking alternative routes, including ship-to-ship transfers near Oman's Sohar port.
For European policymakers, this makes the Bab el-Mandeb issue considerably more tangible.
The security question is no longer simply whether a tanker can move through a distant strait. It concerns whether disruptions in Yemen can affect the physical availability, timing and cost of energy delivered to European markets.
The same logic applies to container shipping.
The Red Sea crisis had previously encouraged carriers to use the Cape of Good Hope, increasing voyage distances and reshaping Mediterranean shipping networks. Research published in 2026 found that these disruptions reallocated capacity within the Mediterranean and strengthened some western Mediterranean hubs while reducing connectivity in parts of the eastern Mediterranean.
The implication is important: a disruption in Bab el-Mandeb can change the geography of European trade even when the Suez Canal itself remains operational.
Suez Is Recovering While Bab el-Mandeb Is Deteriorating
One of the most revealing developments of September is that the situation cannot be described simply as a renewed collapse of the Suez Canal.
On September 16, the Suez Canal Authority announced the return of COSCO Shipping to the canal with the transit of OOCL PORTUGAL from Belgium to China. The authority said the vessel's passage marked COSCO's first southbound transit through the canal since the escalation around the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb. It also reported that container-ship net tonnage transiting the canal during January–August 2026 had reached 72.1 million tonnes, compared with 46.7 million in the same period of 2025.
This is a critical distinction.
The northern end of the maritime system can recover even while the southern end becomes more insecure. Some carriers may therefore return to Suez when the commercial benefits outweigh the perceived risks, while others may retain alternative routing strategies.
The IMF's assessment nevertheless shows that the recovery remains incomplete. Its 2026 report noted that average Suez Canal traffic during fiscal year 2025/26 remained around 39 vessels per day, compared with about 73 in 2023.
The strategic problem for Egypt is therefore not simply revenue loss. It is the conditional nature of the canal's advantage.
The Suez Canal shortens Asia-Europe voyages dramatically compared with the Cape route. The Suez Canal Authority has noted that the use of Suez rather than routing around Africa can save approximately two weeks on some services.
But a canal's geographical advantage can only be fully exploited when the wider maritime corridor remains commercially acceptable.
That is why Bab el-Mandeb is strategically important to Cairo even when no vessel is physically prevented from entering the canal.
Europe Responds: From Escort Missions to a Higher-Risk Environment
The European response provides perhaps the clearest evidence that the character of the crisis has changed.
The European Union's Operation ASPIDES was established to protect commercial shipping in the Red Sea. In September 2026, the mission entered a more demanding phase.
On September 18, EU foreign-policy chief Kaja Kallas said that Operation ASPIDES had raised the alert level of its vessels because of the deteriorating security environment while continuing its escort duties.
Italy moved in a similar direction. Defence Minister Guido Crosetto called for a stronger naval presence in the Red Sea and said Italy was preparing for a possible naval deployment amid the growing threat to merchant shipping. Italy is already part of ASPIDES, but Rome's position reflected concern that the existing level of naval protection might no longer match the emerging environment.
This is strategically significant because Europe is no longer responding only to a discrete series of attacks on individual commercial vessels.
The European calculation is increasingly being shaped by the possibility of persistent maritime risk.
That kind of risk is different from an emergency in which a few ships are attacked and naval forces respond tactically. Persistent uncertainty forces shipping companies to make longer-term decisions about routes, fleet allocation, insurance and port connectivity.
The academic literature supports this interpretation. Donelli's analysis of the Red Sea argues that Yemen has produced a hybrid security complex in which land-based conflict and maritime insecurity increasingly reinforce one another.
Washington Is Balancing Deterrence and Crisis Management
The United States faces a different calculation.
Washington has strong strategic interests in maintaining freedom of navigation, protecting regional partners and preventing further disruption to global commerce. Yet the United States is also dealing with a broader confrontation with Iran and has resisted turning the renewed Houthi offensive into another open-ended U.S. military campaign.
Reuters reported that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman sought U.S. military support against the Houthis, but Washington did not authorize direct U.S. strikes and instead provided intelligence and targeting assistance. The Saudi leadership subsequently met with the commander of U.S. Central Command.
At the same time, Reuters reported that U.S. officials met Houthi representatives in Oman over the weekend.
The result is a dual-track American posture: defensive coordination with partners alongside indirect communication intended to prevent an uncontrolled expansion of the conflict.
From a strategic perspective, the importance of this arrangement lies precisely in its ambiguity.
Washington is attempting to protect the maritime system without necessarily becoming the single actor responsible for enforcing security along every part of it.
China Enters the Crisis Through Energy Security
China's role has also changed.
Saudi Arabia turned to Beijing after the Houthi advance around Bab el-Mandeb increased the vulnerability of Saudi oil exports. Reuters reported that Chinese officials privately urged Tehran to use its influence over the Houthis to restrain further escalation. Publicly, Beijing continued to call for restraint, dialogue and the restoration of safe navigation.
The importance of this development is not that China has become a military actor in the Red Sea.
It has not.
Rather, China is demonstrating that maritime insecurity is becoming an issue of strategic economic diplomacy.
The Bab el-Mandeb problem affects Chinese interests because the strait belongs to a broader maritime system connecting Asian production and energy consumption to European markets. Disruptions can therefore produce costs even when Chinese vessels are not the principal targets.
This is a different form of power from naval deployment. It operates through economic dependence, diplomatic access and relationships with regional actors.
Egypt's Position Is Becoming More Central
For Egypt, the September developments have revived an old strategic question in a new form.
On September 15, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman emphasized the need to preserve freedom and security of navigation in Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea. Cairo also expressed support for Saudi measures to protect its security and for a comprehensive political settlement in Yemen.
This matters because Egypt does not encounter Bab el-Mandeb as a distant maritime issue.
The Suez Canal is physically located hundreds of kilometres to the north, but strategically the two points belong to the same corridor.
Egypt can therefore experience the consequences of instability at Bab el-Mandeb even when Egyptian territorial waters remain unaffected.
The issue is not only canal revenue. It includes Egypt's position within the broader maritime system, its ability to benefit from Asia-Europe trade, the security of the Red Sea, and its ability to influence regional security arrangements around the corridor.
This is where the idea of cumulative strategic narrowing becomes useful.
It does not require a coordinated strategy directed against Egypt. Nor does it require assuming that every actor operating in the Red Sea is pursuing the same objectives.
Instead, it describes a cumulative process in which several independent changes can simultaneously reduce strategic flexibility: greater insecurity around Bab el-Mandeb, changing naval deployments, competition around Red Sea ports, changing patterns of external security assistance, increased dependence on multinational maritime arrangements, and continuing strategic pressure elsewhere in the Horn of Africa and Nile Basin.
The result can be a narrower range of options even without a single actor deliberately engineering that outcome.
The Human Geography of the Crisis Is Also Changing
There is another development that should not be treated as secondary.
The military transformation of the western Yemeni coast is producing a corresponding transformation across the Gulf of Aden.
On September 18, UN agencies reported through Reuters that at least 112,000 people had been internally displaced in Yemen during the previous two weeks, while nearly 3,000 people had crossed by sea to Djibouti. Djibouti was preparing for additional arrivals as the fighting continued.
The movement of civilians toward the African shore demonstrates how quickly the Red Sea can cease to function as a boundary between two theatres.
Yemen's war is already creating direct social and logistical consequences across the water in Djibouti, while reports have also identified people moving toward Somaliland and Puntland.
This reinforces the argument that the Red Sea should not be analysed solely through military geography.
Ports, refugee movements, logistics, humanitarian access, shipping routes and military deployments are interacting within the same spatial system.
The Historical Perspective: Bab el-Mandeb and Egyptian Strategy
The strategic importance of Bab el-Mandeb to Egypt predates the contemporary Houthi crisis.
During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Egyptian naval forces were involved in restricting maritime access to Israel through the Red Sea. U.S. diplomatic records from the period document the issue of the Bab el-Mandeb blockade and its role in subsequent disengagement arrangements.
But the historical comparison should not be overstated.
In 1973, Egypt was a state actor operating within a conventional interstate war. The contemporary challenge is structurally different: a non-state armed movement with territorial control can combine coastal positions, missiles, drones and asymmetric tactics to impose risks on international shipping without needing conventional naval supremacy.
This is one of the most important changes in modern maritime conflict.
The actor creating the disruption does not necessarily need to physically close the route.
It needs only to change the risk calculation surrounding the route.
Four Analytical Pathways for the Red Sea
The current situation does not point to a single predetermined outcome. Several pathways can be identified according to how the conflict develops.
Contained maritime insecurity
Under this pathway, commercial navigation continues while regional governments and external powers increase defensive measures. Saudi Arabia could strengthen air and missile defenses, European ships could operate at a higher alert level, the United States could continue intelligence and targeting cooperation, and indirect contacts with the Houthis could remain available through Oman.
In that environment, Bab el-Mandeb would remain navigable but structurally more expensive and uncertain.
Expansion of the coastal conflict
A second pathway would involve further Houthi consolidation along the western coast and additional pressure on territories and infrastructure beyond the immediate Bab el-Mandeb area.
The strategic consequence would be a shift from protecting individual ships to protecting the wider geography surrounding the chokepoint: coastlines, islands, ports, surveillance systems and logistics nodes.
This would also increase the significance of the African coast.
Political re-entry
A different pathway would involve the reopening of serious negotiations over Yemen's political order.
The UN has continued to argue for a political process even as the military situation deteriorates. Such a process would have to address not only the question of ceasefires but the political and territorial arrangements governing Yemen's coast and ports.
Without that dimension, maritime protection could remain an endless substitute for political settlement.
A more distributed Red Sea security architecture
The longer-term transformation may lie in the gradual emergence of a security system involving overlapping actors rather than a single dominant naval guarantor.
The United States, European states, Gulf governments, Egypt and other regional actors may contribute different capabilities: surveillance, air defense, escort missions, intelligence, port infrastructure, logistics and diplomacy.
China may operate primarily through economic and diplomatic channels rather than naval protection.
Such an arrangement would not necessarily constitute a political alliance. It would be better understood as a distributed security architecture around a shared maritime system.
What Has Changed by September 19?
The most significant change is not that Bab el-Mandeb has suddenly become an impassable strait.
It has not.
Commercial traffic is still moving through it. What has changed is the risk structure surrounding the passage.
The Houthis now possess a much more consequential territorial position along Yemen's Red Sea coast. Saudi Arabia is under direct pressure from missiles and drones and is also dealing with vulnerabilities to its energy-export infrastructure. The European Union has increased the alert posture of its Red Sea mission. Italy is calling for a stronger maritime presence. China is using diplomatic channels with Iran. Washington is simultaneously supporting regional defense efforts and maintaining a channel with the Houthis. And Egypt has returned to the centre of the regional discussion because the security of Bab el-Mandeb directly affects the strategic value of Suez.
The events of September 19 add another layer. Saudi Arabia issued emergency alerts over what it described as a hostile aerial threat, while the immediate source of the incident remained unconfirmed. That uncertainty itself illustrates the changing operating environment: governments and markets are increasingly responding not only to confirmed attacks, but to the possibility of attacks and the need to remain prepared for them.
For Europe and the United States, the strategic question is therefore broader than the security of one strait.
For Europe, it concerns maritime trade, energy access, insurance and the resilience of Mediterranean ports.
For the United States, it concerns how to preserve freedom of navigation without allowing every regional chokepoint to become another open-ended military theatre.
For China, it concerns the security of long-distance energy and trade networks.
For Saudi Arabia, it concerns the survivability of alternative export routes when both Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb are exposed to disruption.
And for Egypt, the issue is structural.
Bab el-Mandeb and Suez are not two separate strategic problems. They are the southern and northern ends of the same maritime system.
That is why the central question is no longer simply whether the Houthis can threaten Bab el-Mandeb.
The more important question is what kind of Red Sea security order will emerge if that threat becomes persistent.
The answer will shape not only Yemen and Saudi Arabia, but the strategic relationship between the Gulf, the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean.
Related References
- Donelli, Federico. 2025. “Maritime Disruption in Yemen: The Making of a Hybrid Red Sea Order.” Middle East Policy 32 (4): 35–50. https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.70018.
- Daudet, Brigitte, Ronan Kerbiriou, and Yann Alix. 2026. “Mediterranean Container Port Reconfiguration under Geopolitical Disruption: An AIS-Based Multi-Scale Analysis.” Maritime Economics & Logistics 28: 409–430. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41278-026-00356-5.
- Simonds, Jessica Kate, and Charles Duncan Pearson. 2026. “Reconceptualising the Red Sea Neighbourhood: Bab-el-Mandeb, Maritime Space, and Regional Boundaries.” The Journal of North African Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2026.2683724.
- Kumar, Ashok. 2026. “Weaponising the Supply Chain: Yemen's Blockade and the Contradictions of Maritime Logistics Capital.” Antipode 58 (1). https://doi.org/10.1111/anti.70107.
- Bedoya-Maya, Felipe, Joris Beckers, Jeroen Cant, Julián Martínez-Moya, Edwin van Hassel, and Thierry Vanelslander. 2025. “Container Port Competitiveness amid Disruptions: Insights from the European Maritime Network during the Red Sea Crisis.” Journal of Transport Geography 128: 104304. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2025.104304.
- Yap, Wei Yim, and Dong Yang. 2024. “Geopolitical Tension and Shipping Network Disruption: Analysis of the Red Sea Crisis on Container Port Calls.” Journal of Transport Geography 121: 104004.
- Li, et al. 2024. “Red Sea Crisis Impacts on Maritime Shipping Networks.” Heliyon 10 (22): e40384. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e40384.