Somalia, Somaliland, Ethiopia and the New Geopolitics of the Red Sea
Why Has Somalia Become So Important to Egypt?
Why has Somalia become so important to Egypt? The answer lies far beyond
Mogadishu, extending through the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb into the Gulf of
Aden and the wider Horn of Africa.
At first glance, Egypt’s growing presence in Somalia may appear to be
primarily a bilateral security issue between Cairo and Mogadishu. Yet the
geography of the region tells a much larger story.
Somalia lies along one of the world’s most strategically important
maritime corridors, where the Red Sea connects with the Gulf of Aden and the
Indian Ocean. Just to the west of the Gulf lies the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the
southern gateway to the Red Sea and a critical link in the maritime route
toward the Suez Canal.
This geography means that developments on the Somali coast can have
consequences far beyond Somalia itself. Political instability, military
deployments, competition over ports, or changes in maritime access can reshape
the security environment of the Red Sea and, eventually, affect Egypt’s most
important maritime artery.
The nature of regional competition has also changed. Rivalry is no longer
defined only by armies, fleets, or military bases. It increasingly involves ports,
trade corridors, logistics networks, maritime infrastructure, and strategic
access. A state or coalition that gains influence over these nodes may
acquire significant leverage over trade and security flows without directly
controlling large areas of territory.
This broader context helps explain Egypt’s growing interest in Somalia.
Cairo increasingly views the country not as a distant African issue, but as
part of a strategic space connecting the Nile, the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb,
the Gulf of Aden, and the Horn of Africa.
The key change, therefore, is not simply the presence of Egyptian
personnel or military cooperation. It is the strategic logic behind that
presence: Egypt is moving toward a more forward form of security policy based
on strategic positioning, partnerships, and networked deterrence.
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| Egypt–Somalia Strategic Partnership |
From Nile Security to Red Sea Security
For decades, Egypt’s engagement with the Horn of Africa was viewed
largely through the lens of the Nile. Ethiopia, in particular, was primarily
considered in relation to water security.
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| Bab el-Mandeb: Gateway to the Red Sea |
The prolonged dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, however,
demonstrated the limitations of treating the Ethiopian question as a water
issue alone.
Ethiopia’s regional strategy increasingly intersects with another major
concern: maritime access. As a landlocked country of more than one hundred
million people, Ethiopia has a powerful economic and strategic incentive to
diversify its access to the sea and reduce its dependence on external maritime
gateways.
That makes the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden increasingly relevant to
Ethiopian national strategy.
For Egypt, the implications are particularly sensitive. The Red Sea is
not a distant maritime space disconnected from Egyptian security. It is the
southern approach to the Suez Canal, through which a major share of
international trade has traditionally passed.
Any prolonged disruption in the southern Red Sea or Gulf of Aden can
therefore generate consequences for Egypt itself, whether through maritime
insecurity, increased shipping costs, disruption of trade routes, or pressure
on the strategic environment surrounding the Suez Canal.
Egypt’s growing involvement in Somalia can consequently be understood as
part of a broader redefinition of its southern strategic environment.
In this perspective, Egyptian security does not begin only at the
country’s borders or along its Red Sea coast. It increasingly extends toward
the geographical points from which pressure on the Red Sea maritime system
could emerge.
Egypt–Somalia Strategic Partnership: What Has Changed?
The relationship between Egypt and Somalia entered a new phase with the
signing of a military cooperation protocol in Cairo on 14 August 2024. The two
governments subsequently elevated their bilateral relations to the level of a strategicpartnership through a joint political declaration signed on 23 January
2025. The declaration explicitly linked bilateral cooperation to the security
and stability of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.
The significance of this development goes beyond the transfer of military
equipment or the training of Somali personnel.
It reflects a broader decision to strengthen the institutions of the
Somali state and its capacity to confront terrorism, protect its land and
maritime borders, and exercise sovereignty over its territory. Egypt has also
discussed its participation in the African Union Support and Stabilization
Mission in Somalia, known as AUSSOM.
This matters because a physical presence or sustained security
partnership gives Egypt greater capacity to monitor developments, support its
Somali partner, and respond to a rapidly changing regional environment.
But the political dimension is equally important.
Egypt has repeatedly affirmed its support for Somalia’s sovereignty,unity, and territorial integrity. This position was reaffirmed during President
Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s meeting with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in
February 2026.
The issue cannot therefore be separated from the wider dispute
surrounding Somaliland.
Somaliland and Ethiopia’s Quest for Maritime Access
The memorandum of understanding announced by Ethiopia and Somaliland on 1
January 2024 transformed the debate over maritime access into one of the most
sensitive geopolitical issues in the Horn of Africa.
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Somaliland and Ethiopia’s Quest for Maritime Access |
The agreement raised questions about access to the sea, possible military facilities, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the political status of Somaliland.
Somaliland has operated with its own institutions since declaring
independence from Somalia in 1991, but it remains internationally unrecognised
as a sovereign state.
For Ethiopia, access to the Somaliland coast offers the possibility of
reducing its heavy dependence on Djibouti and diversifying its maritime
options.
For Somalia, however, the issue is fundamentally different. Mogadishu
regards Somaliland as part of the Federal Republic of Somalia and has rejected
unilateral arrangements concerning its territory.
The United Nations Secretary-General explicitly recalled in January 2024
that the Security Council had repeatedly affirmed respect for Somalia’s sovereignty,territorial integrity and unity and called on the parties to avoid further
escalation.
The African Union made a similar point, stressing the importance of
respecting the unity, territorial integrity, and full sovereignty of its member
states while urging Ethiopia and Somalia to resolve their differences
peacefully.
The dispute, therefore, is about much more than a coastal strip.
The deeper question is whether maritime access can be negotiated in a way
that changes political realities on the ground without destabilising the
territorial order of the Horn of Africa.
Why Is Berbera So Important?
The geopolitical significance of Somaliland cannot be separated from the
growing importance of Berbera Port.
Berbera has developed into a major logistical gateway on the Gulf of Aden. DP World describes the port as a strategic gateway to East Africa and highlights its connection to regional trade networks, including routes linking Berbera to Ethiopia.
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Berbera: The Geopolitics of Ports |
The importance of a modern port, however, extends well beyond its docks.
A strategically located port can become part of a larger networkinvolving roads, border crossings, warehouses, industrial zones, logistics
centres, and inland markets. Influence over the port can therefore translate
into influence over the wider economic corridor connected to it.
This is the essence of what may be called the geopolitics of ports.
Berbera is particularly important because of its geographical position
and its potential connection to Ethiopia, one of Africa’s largest economies and
its largest landlocked states by population.
At the same time, the Egyptian perspective should not be reduced to a
simple narrative of an “anti-Egyptian alliance.”
Economic investment by the UAE in regional infrastructure does not, by
itself, constitute an anti-Egyptian strategy. The strategic concern arises when
commercial infrastructure becomes intertwined with political influence,
security arrangements, and competing visions of regional order.
The question for Cairo is therefore not whether every external investment
should be opposed. It is whether Somalia can maintain viable and sovereign
maritime alternatives under the authority of its federal institutions.
This is why strengthening Somalia’s recognised federal institutions and
developing alternative maritime and economic corridors can have significance
well beyond their immediate commercial value.
Is the Horn of Africa Entering a New Military Competition?
Not necessarily—but the region is clearly entering a new phase of strategic
positioning.
Military power is only one component of this competition. Ports,
logistics, diplomatic partnerships, intelligence, infrastructure, and access to
maritime corridors increasingly operate together.
This is where the concept of Networked Deterrence becomes useful.
Networked deterrence refers to a security approach that does not rely on
concentrating military strength in a single location. Instead, it connects
partnerships, logistical facilities, maritime access points, intelligence and
surveillance capabilities, and strategic deployments into a wider system.
The purpose is not necessarily to prepare for war. It is to shape the
strategic environment in ways that make hostile or destabilising actions more
difficult before they directly affect the state’s core interests.
For Egypt, this has a clear maritime dimension.
Protecting the Suez Canal cannot depend exclusively on what happens
inside the Canal or along Egypt’s northern Red Sea coast. It also requires
attention to the wider chain of maritime geography extending through the
southern Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, the Gulf of Aden, and the Horn of Africa.
Yet forward positioning carries risks as well.
The deeper Egypt becomes involved in Somalia, the greater the possibility
that Cairo could be drawn into conflicts that are primarily local or regional.
A deterioration in relations between Somalia and Ethiopia, or increasing
tensions between Mogadishu and Somaliland, could therefore create pressures
that extend beyond Egypt’s original objectives.
Three broad scenarios illustrate the possible direction of travel.
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Three Possible Futures for Egypt’s Presence in Somalia
1. Containment and Stabilisation
The first scenario is the most moderate.
Egypt maintains its strategic partnership with Mogadishu while diplomatic
efforts contain tensions surrounding Ethiopia and Somaliland. Egyptian
involvement continues to strengthen Somali state institutions without turning
into direct confrontation with another regional power.
Under this scenario, Egypt’s presence functions primarily as a
stabilising and deterrent mechanism rather than as an instrument of war.
For Cairo, this would be the most manageable outcome: stronger Somali institutions, greater security around the southern Red Sea, and no need to open a new military front.
2. Escalation into Proxy Conflict
The second scenario is considerably more dangerous.
Political competition could evolve into indirect confrontation, with
local actors receiving support from competing regional powers. Somalia and
Somaliland could increasingly become arenas in which broader geopolitical
rivalries are played out.
Such an environment would also create opportunities for armed groups,
including al-Shabaab, to exploit instability.
The consequences would not remain confined to Somalia. Greater insecurity
around the Gulf of Aden could affect shipping routes, insurance costs, maritime
security, and the wider international trading system.
3. A Broader Regional Security Framework
The third scenario is the most ambitious, but potentially the most
sustainable.
Instead of allowing the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden to become a collection
of competing military positions, regional states could develop stronger
mechanisms for maritime security, counter-terrorism, protection of commercial
shipping, and crisis management.
Such a framework would shift the region away from unilateral strategic
competition and toward a more coordinated system in which regional states share
responsibility for maritime stability.
For Egypt, this would be the most favourable long-term outcome.
What Does Egypt Need to Do?
The sustainability of Egypt’s presence in Somalia will not depend on
military power alone.
Military capabilities can protect strategic interests, but they cannot by
themselves produce durable political influence.
Egypt therefore needs to combine hard power, development, and
diplomacy.
Strengthening Somali institutions, expanding cooperation in health,
education, water, energy, and professional training, and supporting state
capacity can give the relationship a broader social foundation.
This is particularly important because Egypt’s strategic partnership with
Somalia already extends beyond security. The 2025 joint declaration included
cooperation in political, economic, judicial, electoral, and capacity-building
fields, as well as priority sectors including agriculture, fisheries,
transport, finance, energy, and construction.
At the same time, Somaliland should not be treated as a completely closed
political file.
Egypt can maintain its support for Somalia’s territorial integrity while
preserving channels of communication with political and economic actors in
Somaliland. Dialogue does not require recognition, nor does engagement
necessarily imply acceptance of every political arrangement.
The broader objective should be to prevent the Horn of Africa from
becoming a region in which economic infrastructure, maritime access, and
security competition become permanently fused into rival blocs.
Egypt also has an interest in stronger regional coordination. The
security of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea cannot realistically be guaranteed
by one country acting alone.
Conclusion: Somalia as a Forward Point of Egyptian Maritime Security
Egypt’s growing presence in Somalia cannot be understood as an isolated
military development.
It is part of a wider transformation in the relationship between Nile
security, Red Sea security, Bab el-Mandeb, Gulf of Aden shipping, and the
strategic geography of the Horn of Africa.
Ethiopia is seeking greater maritime access and a more diversified
regional position. Somaliland is seeking to maximise the strategic value of its
geographic location. Ports such as Berbera are becoming increasingly important
nodes in regional trade and logistics networks. Meanwhile, Mogadishu is seeking
to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Somali state.
Egypt is responding to this changing environment from a more forward
strategic position than in previous decades.
The central question is therefore no longer simply whether Egypt should
be present in Somalia.
The more important question is how Egypt can ensure that its presence
remains a source of deterrence and regional stability rather than becoming a
long-term military burden or drawing Cairo into conflicts it cannot control.
This is the central strategic dilemma.
Egypt needs to be close enough to potential sources of instability to
influence the strategic environment, but not so deeply involved that every
local confrontation becomes an Egyptian confrontation.
The emerging geography is clear: protecting the Suez Canal no longer
begins only at Suez or Port Said. It increasingly extends southward—to the Red
Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, the Gulf of Aden, and the Horn of Africa.
From this perspective, Somalia is no longer simply a distant African file
for Egypt. It is becoming one of the forward strategic points from which
Egypt can help protect its wider maritime security environment.
Selected Sources
- Presidency of
the Arab Republic of Egypt. “Joint Political Declaration to Elevate
Relations between Egypt and Somalia to Strategic Partnership.” 23 January
2025.
- Presidency of
the Arab Republic of Egypt. “President El-Sisi’s Speech at Joint Press
Conference with President of Federal Republic of Somalia.” 23 January
2025.
- State
Information Service of Egypt. “Egypt and Somalia.”
- African Union.
“The Chairperson of the African Union Commission calls for mutual respect
between Ethiopia and Somalia.” 3 January 2024.
- United Nations
Secretary-General. “Readout of the Secretary-General’s phone call with
H.E. Mr. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, President of the Federal Republic of
Somalia.” 10 January 2024.
- DP World.
“Berbera Port: Your Strategic Gateway to East Africa.”